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Paolo Dardanelli*
*University of Kent; p.dardanelli@kent.ac.uk
This article addresses long-standing challenges in conceptualizing andmeasuring de/centralization
in unitary and federal systems. It first outlines a novel conceptualization of de/centralization and its
relation to the unitary/federal distinction and a/symmetry, from which it derives static and
dynamic typologies of state structures. Building on a critical review of the Regional Authority
Index, the article develops a scheme for measuring de/centralization and applies it to map state
structures inWestern Europe from1950 to 2015.This mapping exercise shows that the proposed
scheme yields more accurate measures of de/centralization than existing indices and that de/
centralization differs in kind, rather than merely in degree, between unitary and federal states. By
enabling amore effective classification of cases in comparative analysis, the article offers a tool on
which theoretical and empirical advances in understanding the causes and effects of state
structures can be built.
“We should also know over which matters several local tribunals are to have jurisdiction, and
in which cases authority should be centralized”1
—Aristotle
As the above quotation illustrates, interest in the vertical structuring of political
systems and the distribution of power within them is as old as the study of politics
itself. Attention to these questions has deepened in the last few decades as many
states have undergone processes of decentralization2 and constitutional restructuring
(e.g., Rodden 2006, 1–2). Such processes have been particularly prominent in
Western Europe, where in some countries, such as Belgium, decentralization has
gone as far as entailing a constitutional transformation of the state from unitary to
federal. In other European countries, e.g., France, however, decentralization has been
much more modest and has not changed the constitutional nature of the state.3
A substantial literature has developed seeking to establish both the causes of
these decentralization reforms as well as the political and economic effects of
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different state structures. Despite significant advances, however, neither question
has been satisfactorily answered. We still do not fully grasp, for instance, why
decentralization has gone further in some countries than others. As regards the
question of whether federalism and decentralization make a difference to
governance and public policy outcomes, findings have also been inconclusive.
Although decentralization is widely praised as leading to better governance, and
has been strongly promoted as such by organizations such as the World Bank (e.g.,
Treisman 2007, 3–4), Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005) find that centraliza-
tion, a core component of which is whether a polity is unitary or federal, leads to
superior outcomes, whereas Biela, Hennl, and Kaiser (2012) argue that the unitary/
federal distinction does not matter much but the degree of de/centralization does.
According to Treisman (2007, 5), “almost no robust empirical findings have been
reported about the consequences of decentralization” (see also Yeung 2009, 22).
An important reason why political science has made only limited progress in
tackling these questions is because long-standing challenges in conceptualizing and
measuring de/centralization in unitary and federal systems, and classifying cases,
are still unresolved.4 As sound conceptualization, measurement and classification
are pre-conditions to description, theorizing, and causal analysis (e.g., Sartori 1970,
1038; Bailey 1994, 1, 15), invalid measurement and/or selection bias due to the
misclassification of cases are significant obstacles to progress.5
This article seeks to help overcome these obstacles by developing static and
dynamic conceptualizations of de/centralization and applying them empirically. The
article is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature,
highlights the divide between qualitative typologies and quantitative indices, and
offers an assessment of the Regional Authority Index (RAI). A subsequent section
develops a new conceptualization of de/centralization, derives from it static and
dynamic typologies, and develops a measurement scheme. The following section
applies these conceptual and methodological tools to measure de/centralization in
Western Europe from 1950 to 2015 and classify cases into different categories of state
structures. The concluding section summarizes the contributions the article seeks to
make and points to their potential to facilitate empirical and theoretical advances.
Conceptualizing and Classifying State Structures:
A Brief Review of the Literature
The distinction between unitary and federal systems has been at the forefront of
attempts to conceptualize and classify state structures since the early days of
modern comparative politics (e.g., Bryce 1921, 435–445; Finer 1932, 243–244).
Although the notion of subcentral autonomy vis-a-vis central governments has
been explicitly or implicitly at the heart of these attempts, fully specifying how de/
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(1946, 1–15) put forward a legalistic distinction between unitary states, in which
local government is subordinated to central government, and federal states, in which
two orders of government coexist, coordinated with, but autonomous from, each
other. On this basis, he considered only four countries to be federal. From a political
science perspective, Riker (1964, 11) defined a federation as a state in which power is
divided between two levels of government in such a way that “each level has at least
one area of action in which it is autonomous.” Elazar (1987, 33–79) described a
federal system as one combining “self-rule” and “shared rule” but did not further
specify the characteristics of a federal state. Reviewing conceptualizations of
federalism in the early 2000s, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004, 5–11)
argued that no one was fully satisfactory and adopted a working definition of a
federal state as one in which policy-makers at different levels of government are
directly elected. In a recent review of the field, Hueglin and Fenna (2015, 16–17)
restate the familiar claim that the defining feature of a federal state is that its regional
governments, as constituent units of the federation, enjoy constitutional protection
unlike subcentral units in unitary states. Yet local governments do enjoy
constitutional protection in many unitary states (e.g., Baldersheim and Sta˚hlberg
2002, 87; Sellers and Lidstro¨m 2007, 617); hence constitutional protection in itself is
not an effective discriminatory feature between unitary and federal systems.
On the specific question of how the unitary/federal distinction relates to de/
centralization, authors have taken widely different positions. At one end of the
spectrum, Kelsen ([1945] 1961, 316) stated: “Only the degree of decentralization
distinguishes a unitary State divided into autonomous provinces from a federal State.”
At the other end, King forcefully rejected this conceptualization, claiming instead that
the defining feature of a federation is the “representation of regional units in the
national legislature,” not the degree of de/centralization (King 1982, 19, also 77, 146).
Lijphart (1999, 188–189) and Biela, Hennl, and Kaiser (2012, 451) argue that unitary/
federal and de/centralized are orthogonal dimensions because some unitary states are
decentralized and some federal ones are centralized. Thus, over two hundred years
since the publication of The Federalist we still do not have a satisfactory
conceptualization of how de/centralization differs across the unitary/federal distinction.
State structures also vary in terms of their degree of a/symmetry, meaning
whether or not the units of subcentral government all have the same constitutional
status and powers, defined, respectively, as a symmetrical or asymmetrical system
(e.g., McGarry 2007; Requejo and Nagel 2010). A/symmetry, though, has rarely
featured in the efforts to conceptualize and classify state structures.
Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches
Mirroring the debate in the literature on democracy (e.g., Collier and Adcock 1999;
Bogaards 2012), these unresolved conceptual issues are reflected in different
Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Mapping State Structures 3
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/publius/pjy019/5055709
by guest
on 19 July 2018
approaches to classification and measurement. On the one hand, there are
qualitative typologies that retain the largely dichotomous distinction between
unitary and federal systems. On the other hand, several quantitative indices of de/
centralization have been developed, at the root of which there is a conceptual-
ization of de/centralization as a continuous variable. To my knowledge, only one
attempt to combine the two approaches has been conducted.
From a review—summarized in table A1 in the Supplemental Online File—of
eight of the most prominent typologies (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, 181; Elazar 1987,
33–79; Keating 1998, 114–115; Keman 2000, 205; Woldendorp, Keman and Budge
2000, 32–38; Lijphart 1999, 188–189; Swenden 2006, 11–18; Watts 2008, 8–18),
three main points emerge. First, there is noticeable variation in the number of
categories employed, from two to five, and in how they are conceptualized. In
most cases, the boundaries between categories are only loosely specified, which
makes it difficult to reach a scholarly consensus on the empirical classification of
cases. Second, none of the authors takes into account the extent to which there is
a/symmetry in the system nor whether particular regions are constitutionally
incorporated or not (see below). As a result, third, there is considerable
disagreement over how Western European states should be classified.
Although they approach the challenge from a very different methodological
basis, some of the most prominent quantitative indices (e.g., Arzaghi and
Henderson 2005; Brancati 2006; Lane and Ersson 1999, 187) display similar
limitations to those of the qualitative typologies: (i) the elements taken into
account to construct such indices are generally not justified on conceptual
grounds; (ii) how quantitative scores relate to conceptual categories such as
unitary/federal is rarely discussed; and (iii) asymmetry is not taken into account.
The result, as summarized in table A2 in the Supplemental Online File, is that the
scoring of actual cases is often perplexing. Denmark, Finland, and Germany, for
instance, are all scored 4 by Lane and Ersson whereas the UK is scored 1. Arzaghi
and Henderson score France as being more decentralized than Spain and as
decentralized as the UK, whereas Brancati scores Switzerland and the UK both as 4.
Keman (2000, esp. 205) is the only one to combine the two methods by using a
quantitative scoring scheme to classify cases into the two conceptual categories of
unitary and federal. His integrated approach is very much in line with what I
propose in this article yet, it does not fully overcome the limitations discussed
above in that it is not based on an explicit conceptualization of how de/
centralization differs across the unitary/federal distinction and does not take into
account a/symmetry. Although most of its scoring of individual cases matches
quite closely the assessments prevailing in the qualitative literature, there are some
problematic results as well. Italy, for instance, is categorized as being more
“federal” than Spain whereas the UK is scored as being almost as centralized as




on 19 July 2018
The RAI: Achievements and Limitations
Hooghe et al. (2016) have put forward the most elaborate and comprehensive
index in the form of the RAI. The RAI conceptualizes de/centralization as being
based on two principal dimensions: self-rule and shared rule. According to the
authors, “Self-rule is the authority that a subnational government exercises in its
own territory. Shared rule is the authority that a subnational government co-
exercises in the country as a whole” (Hooghe et al. 2016, 23). The first dimension
is operationalized through the following variables: institutional depth, policy scope,
fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy, and representation. As for shared rule, this
captures regions’ involvement at the central level in law making, executive control,
fiscal control, borrowing control, and constitutional reform (table A3 in the
Supplemental Online File). The index also measures the extent of a/symmetry
within each of the two main dimensions.
There is little doubt that the RAI is a major achievement in the quest for
conceptualizing and measuring state structures, in terms of both sophistication and
coverage. Yet, it still suffers from significant limitations that ultimately prevent it
from being a fully satisfactory measure of de/centralization and how it varies across
the unitary/federal divide. These limitations relate to (i) the conceptualization of
shared rule as a dimension of de/centralization, (ii) the procedure for the
calculation of the country-level self-rule score, (iii) the weight given to institutional
versus policy autonomy in measuring self-rule, and (iv) the lack of a specification
of how RAI scores relate to de/centralization across the unitary/federal distinction.
The first is that the RAI conceptualizes shared rule as one of the two principal
dimensions of de/centralization. The problem here is that self-rule rests on the
underlying notion of autonomy whereas shared rule rests on that of influence. A
fundamental conceptual difference between self-rule as autonomy and shared rule
as influence at the center is that the former applies to individual subcentral units
whereas the latter generally applies to them collectively. The only exception is
where there are forms of bilateral shared rule between an individual unit and the
central government. Therefore, if we understand de/centralization as the
autonomy that each subcentral government has vis-a-vis the central government,
shared rule—unless bilateral—is not a component of de/centralization. Rather
than being two dimensions of the same concept, they are two different concepts. It
follows that a system with high self-rule and low shared rule should be considered
much more decentralized than a system with low self-rule and high shared rule.
Hooghe et al. (2016, 24) recognize that “Self-rule and shared rule are distinct domains
of regional governance,” but do not acknowledge the problem of conceptualizing
shared rule as a dimension of de/centralization, arguing (Hooghe et al. 2016, 19): “If
the RAI is aggregated to the country level it can be interpreted as a measure of
decentralization.”
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The measurement problems generated by this conceptualization can be clearly
seen in the scoring, for example, of Germany versus Switzerland. For 2010,
Germany scores 37 on the total RAI versus Switzerland’s 26.5 (Hooghe et al. 2016,
Appendix–Country Scores). On this measure, then, Germany should be considered
much more decentralized than Switzerland is. Yet, this is difficult to reconcile with
the general consensus among scholars that Germany is a less decentralized federal
state than Switzerland (e.g., Braun 2011; Hesse 1962; McKay 2001).
The second limitation is constituted by the fact that the RAI’s self-rule scores
are a sum of the scores attributed to each intermediate level of government
between the local and the central level so that a country scores more highly the
more tiers it has (Hooghe et al. 2016, 107fn27). The RAI, moreover, employs an
absolute population criterion to decide what constitutes a “regional” government
as opposed to a local government, with the consequences that functionally
equivalent tiers are included for some countries but not for others.6 This
methodological choice appears to rest on the ground that the more subcentral tiers
in a country the higher its level of regional self-rule, but it is highly debatable
whether this is actually so. Consider one system in which a higher tier of
subcentral government decides on school curricula and a lower tier maintains
school buildings and another system in which a single intermediate tier is
responsible both for setting the curricula and for maintaining the buildings. Is self-
rule really higher in the former than the latter? Like the addition of self-rule and
shared rule, this methodological choice produces awkward scorings. For example,
not only Germany, but Italy and even France are scored as having higher regional
self-rule than Switzerland (Hooghe et al. 2016, Appendix–Country Scores).
The third issue is that the measurement scheme for self-rule overestimates the
importance of institutional and fiscal factors and lumps together different forms of
authority over policy. Out of a maximum of eighteen points, seven are allocated to
both the institutional and the fiscal dimensions against four to the policy
dimension.7 On the policy dimension itself, points are allocated for the range of
policy responsibilities a subcentral government has without distinguishing whether
this is, for instance, an exclusive primary lawmaking power or merely an
administrative responsibility. This once again leads to scorings that are difficult to
square with most qualitative assessments. The British counties, for instance, are
scored as having the same self-rule as the Northern Ireland parliament between
1950 and 1972 (Hooghe et al. 2016, Appendix—Regional Scores), which experts
consider as having had “many of the characteristics of an independent state”
(Birrell and Murie 1980, 28).
Last, but not least, although the RAI is based on the notions of self-rule and
shared rule that are often considered to be at the heart of the concept of federalism,
it does not define how its measures of “regional authority” relate to the conceptual
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of regional authority make a state federal? Hooghe and her collaborators touch
upon the question but ultimately leave it unanswered (Hooghe et al. 2016, 18).
Given these problematic aspects, the RAI, as we have seen, produces scores that,
if used as conceptualized by Hooghe et al. (2016), are at odds with a broad
consensus among country experts and qualitative comparative scholars. This
undermines its validity for it limits its ability to “meaningfully capture the ideas
contained in the corresponding concept” (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530; also Goertz
2006, 27–67; Miller 2007, 86). Moreover, it does not clarify the relationship between
“regional authority”—or de/centralization—and the unitary/federal distinction.
Despite marking a major step forward, thus, the RAI still falls short of providing a
measurement scheme able to successfully address these conceptual questions.
Summary
To sum up, there are four main issues with the state of the art. First, qualitative
typologies and quantitative indices have developed largely in isolation from each
other and little effort has been made to combine their strengths and minimize their
limitations. Second, qualitative typologies are often based on vague categories and
would benefit from more rigorous conceptualization, whereas quantitative indices
also tend to be under-conceptualized and do not generally address the question of
how continuous measures of de/centralization relate to the unitary/federal
dichotomy. Third, both qualitative typologies and quantitative indices often
produce classifications/scorings that are at odds with prevailing assessments in the
literature and contradictory with each other. As a result, fourth, how de/
centralization varies across the unitary/federal divide is still weakly specified and
the classification of cases uncertain. These issues represent a major obstacle to
scholarly progress in this subfield of political science. The framework I propose in
the next section intends to overcome these problems.
Conceptualizing and Classifying State Structures: A New
Integrated Approach
The conceptualization and classification proposed here rest on a belief in the value
of integrating qualitative and quantitative approaches. On the one hand,
quantification can provide a degree of precision that adds rigor to qualitative
categories. On the other hand, the latter are still helpful in identifying distinct
forms of state that are more than mere points on an unbroken continuum. A way
of integrating the two approaches is to think of the underlying conceptual
dimension as a continuum divided by a threshold beyond which differences of
degree become differences of kind.8 For our purposes, as argued below, we can
conceptualize de/centralization9 as the underlying continuum, and unitarism/
federalism as sections or segments of that continuum divided by a threshold.10
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Cross-sectional and cross-temporal differences in de/centralization within one
section should be considered differences of degree whereas differences between
points located across sections should be considered differences of kind. In other
words, depending on whether a difference crosses a threshold or not, it should be
considered a difference of kind or, respectively, of degree (figure 1).
Conceptualizing State Structures
The conceptualization of state structures I am proposing draws its foundation
from Wheare’s and Riker’s definition of a federal state.11 As we saw above, both
authors based it on the notion of autonomy for the federal level of government as
well as for the constituent units. Given that the central government is autonomous
in both a unitary and a federal system, these definitions imply that the
discriminating feature between the two state structures is that in a federal system
regional units—as constituent units of the federation—also enjoy autonomy in at
least one policy field while this is not the case in a unitary system. The notion of
autonomy for the constituent units is so central to most conceptualizations of
federalism that over sixty years ago Livingston (1956, 10) observed: “That the real
key to the nature of the federation is in the distribution of powers seems to be
agreed upon by nearly every writer who addresses himself to the question.”
Autonomy is also at the heart of most conceptualizations of de/centralization
(e.g., Fesler 1965; Oates 1972, 19fn20; Hutchcroft 2001; Schneider 2003; Dubois
and Fattore 2009). As both federalism versus unitarism and decentralization versus
centralization revolve around the notion of subcentral governments’ autonomy vis-
a-vis the central government, we can say that they are based on the same
underlying concept. Following Adcock and Collier (2001, 531), autonomy can be
considered the “background concept” and de/centralization the “systematized
concept.” De/centralization can be defined as the degree to which each subcentral
government is autonomous vis-a-vis the central government at any given point in
time. The more autonomous each subcentral government is, the more
decentralized (or less centralized) the system is. Autonomy in this case is
      De/Centralization continuum 
0------1------2------3------4------5------6------7------8------9------10------11------12------13------14
Unitary Federal
Differences of degree Differences of degree
 Differences of kind 
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understood as the degree to which each subcentral government unit is able to take
binding decisions on public policy unconstrained by the central government or
other subcentral governments.12
If we understand de/centralization in both unitary and federal states as being
fundamentally based on the underlying dimension of autonomy, we can appreciate
how shared rule—understood as codecision at the center—is a different dimension,
additional to autonomy rather than a component of it. This is particularly the case
where multilateral shared rule is concerned, given that it is exercised by the
constituent units collectively, whereas bilateral shared rule may be construed as an
additional element of regional autonomy or at least providing some protection for
it. As such, multilateral shared rule is not an aspect of the degree of de/
centralization of a state. To illustrate the point, Germany’s L€ander have much more
extensive shared rule rights than Canada’s provinces but that does not make
Germany more decentralized than Canada; the opposite is true. In essence, a system
with high autonomy for its regional units and zero shared rule would still be federal,
whereas a system with zero regional autonomy and high shared rule should not be
considered federal. On these grounds, we can leave multilateral shared rule out of
our conceptualization of de/centralization across the unitary/federal distinction.
Most social science concepts are multidimensional (e.g., Lazarsfeld 1966, 188–
189; Adcock and Collier 2001, 533) and autonomy, as defined above, is no
exception. It can be thought of as having three components: institutional
autonomy, policy autonomy, and fiscal autonomy. This is because to be able to act
with a degree of autonomy a subcentral government in a modern state needs to
have an institutional set up conducive to the formulation of its own policy
preferences, the legal competence to enact binding policy decisions on those
preferences, and a degree of fiscal autonomy to finance such policy decisions. All
three components of autonomy are best thought of as gradations, thus leading to
conceptualizing de/centralization as a continuum.
Yet, as we move along the continuum of de/centralization and bear in mind the
traditional conceptions of autonomy in unitary and federal states, we can see that
the continuum is not a completely “fluid” one and that it is meaningful to apply
qualitative categories to different sections of it. The difference between a regional
government with no directly elected institutions, policy execution responsibilities
only, and fiscal dependence on central government conditional grants, at one end,
and a regional government with directly elected institutions, extensive primary law-
making powers, and high fiscal autonomy, at the other end, is one of kind, not just
of degree. The former would be unthinkable in a genuine federal system whereas
the latter would be incompatible with a unitary structure of government. In other
words, somewhere along the continuum there is a threshold that divides unitary
from federal systems and differences that cross the threshold are of kind rather
than merely of degree. As discussed in the measurement and mapping sections
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below, the differences in de/centralization between unitary and federal systems are
sufficiently “neat” to constitute two, rather three or more, categories.13 On this
basis, I conceptualize unitary/federal as being a qualitative dichotomy anchored on
a de/centralization continuum (figure 1).
If we accept the above, a difficult subsequent step is, as Bogaards (2012) has
pointed out, to decide where to “draw the line,” first in terms of conceptualization
and then in terms of measurement. We can approach this task by reasoning about
the attributes the regional governments of a state need in order for it to be
meaningfully conceptualized as a federal state in de/centralization terms. Following
the three-part disaggregation of the concept of autonomy outlined above, we can
say that such a government needs at a minimum:
(a) an assembly directly elected by the people of the region14 and an executive
either accountable to the assembly or directly elected by the people of the
region.
(b) primary law-making powers in at least one of the key areas of government
action in a modern state—that is, economic policy, cultural-educational policy,
and welfare policy—even if concurrently with the central government.
(c) not being dependent on conditional fiscal transfers for the majority of its
revenues. This can take various forms—e.g. through revenue-sharing, block
grants, autonomous taxation powers—but all of them can be considered to
confer a sufficient degree of fiscal autonomy to enable a government to put
into practice the policy decisions it chooses.
The three minima can be considered individually necessary and jointly sufficient
for a regional government to be considered to be in a federal relationship with the
central government. The point on the de/centralization continuum marked by their
aggregate presence (I discuss aggregation below) can thus be seen as the threshold
between unitarism and federalism. They are not, however, necessary to the same
extent. Employing Goertz’s (2006, 135–139) notion of “degrees of substitutability,”
we can say there is asymmetrical substitutability across them. Regional units’
possession of primary law-making powers is the defining property (e.g., Sartori
[1984] 2009, 109, 126) of a federation. Its presence breaks the unitary character of
government within a polity, for it allows for a portion of its territory to be
governed by different laws, while its absence deprives a system of its federal quality.
Hence, nominally federal states in which regional units do not possess meaningful
primary law-making powers cease to be genuine federal systems.
The other two dimensions, by contrast, are not exclusive to federal systems. The
direct election of a regional assembly, though necessary for the formulation of
regional preferences consistent with the concept of autonomy, is not, by itself,
sufficient to make a system federal. The fact that it is widely present in unitary
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on conditional fiscal transfers does not make a system federal either. Around their
minimal values, substitutability between them is low, because a system needs a
minimum level of all three forms of autonomy to be considered federal. At higher
levels, though, substitutability increases, particularly between policy and fiscal
autonomy. High fiscal autonomy, for instance, can be said to be able to substitute
for limited primary law-making powers and vice-versa. As discussed below, the
asymmetrical nature of substitutability between the three dimensions of autonomy
has significant operationalization implications.
So far I have focused on de/centralization across the unitary/federal distinction
and have not addressed the question of a/symmetry. Although in some systems all
regional governments can be considered to be in a federal relationship with the
central government, in others only some are so. Although we have a well-
established label for the former, that of federal state, how should we characterize
the latter? I propose to adopt a population criterion, whereby I consider the
percentage of a state’s population that live under “strong,” as defined above,
regional government. On this basis we can draw a distinction between systems in
which only a small proportion of the population is in this situation and systems in
which a substantial proportion—but not the totality—live under “strong” regional
government. Although percentages are inevitably arbitrary, 10 percent is probably a
convenient cut off point.15 Systems in which less than 10 percent of the population
live under “strong” regional government can be thought of as being essentially
unitary states with a special exception. I refer to them as unitary with special
autonomy. If “strong” regional government concerns more than 10 percent of the
population, by contrast, I argue that the constitutional character of the state can no
longer be accurately described as unitary. I refer to them as partially federal.16
Another aspect we need to consider is whether the regional government in
question is “constitutionally incorporated” or not. Borrowing from US constitu-
tional terminology (Van Dyke 1992; Statham 2002), I distinguish between
incorporated and unincorporated territories as follows. The former are territories
that are constitutionally an integral part of the state whereas the latter are under
the sovereignty of the state but are not constitutionally considered an integral part
of it. If the areas enjoying special autonomy are “non-incorporated,” that is, they
are considered to be separate from the main constitutional body of the state, they
are best described as “federacies” (Elazar 1987, 54–57; Watts 2008, 10) but the
federacy label is less appropriate for constitutionally incorporated regions. This
distinction matters because regional governments possessing high autonomy are
often unincorporated territories.
The last relevant aspect is where the subcentral government is geographically
located. I distinguish between the mainland (the main landmass of the state),
offshore (physically separated but within Europe), and overseas (outside Europe).
Like the previous aspect, this one matters too because subcentral governments
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located overseas often have high autonomy. Because of their distance from the
mainland, their autonomy is arguably less consequential for the constitutional
structure of the state and should thus be treated differently. In the remainder of this
article I focus on incorporated territories located either in the mainland or offshore
only. Table A4 in the Supplemental Online File provides a cross-tabulation of the
Western European states’ territorial units by constitutional status (incorporated/
unincorporated) and geographical location (mainland/offshore/overseas).
Static and Dynamic Classifications
On the basis of the above conceptualization, we can classify static state structures
into the following four-fold typology:
(a) Unitary state: no subcentral government reaches the autonomy threshold
defined above so should be considered “weak.”
(b) Unitary state with special autonomy: there is one (or more) constitutionally
incorporated “strong” regional government/s—that is, reaching the above
autonomy threshold—but such autonomy only concerns up to 10 percent of
the country’s population.
(c) Partially federal state: more than 10 but less than 100 percent of the population
live under “strong” regional government.
(d) Federal state: the entire population live under “strong” regional government.
From a dynamic perspective, state restructuring can be defined as a significant
change in the way a state is structured, which can occur by constitutional and/or
nonconstitutional means. We can distinguish two broad categories of state
restructuring: “strong” and “weak.” Strong state restructuring occurs when changes
in the way the state is vertically structured entail a transition from one category to
another, leading to a difference of kind. An example is a transition from a unitary
to a partially federal state. Weak state restructuring, by contrast, is constituted by
changes that do not entail a transition from one category to another, that is,
changes of degree rather than kind. This would be the case, for example, of a
unitary state introducing a tier of weak regional governments. In conceptualizing
state restructuring, it is useful to distinguish between macro-local and regional tiers
of subcentral government. The former is the upper tier of local government and
typically represents the traditional intermediate level of government in unitary
states.17 Regional governments, on the contrary, cover a larger geographical area,
are clearly distinct from local government, and in federal states are considered
constituent units of the federation. Taking into account all the possible changes
relating to these two tiers of subcentral government, we can identify 32 specific
categories of state restructuring. Twelve of them can be grouped under the “strong
restructuring” heading whereas the remaining 20 are forms of “weak
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Table 1 Typology of state restructuring
A Strong—change of kind between
categories
A1.1 Unitary to federal: creation of strong
regional governments or strength-
ening of existing regional govern-
ments covering the entire state
population to a score 8.
A1.2 Federal to unitary: abolition or
weakening of strong regional gov-
ernments covering the entire state
population to a score 8.
A2.1 Unitary to partially federal: creation
of strong regional governments or
strengthening of existing regional
governments covering >10% but
<100% of the state population to a
score 8.
A2.2 Partially federal to unitary: abolition
or weakening of strong regional
governments covering >10% but
<100% of the state population to a
score 8.
A3.1 Unitary to unitary with SA: creation
of strong regional governments or
strengthening of existing regional
governments covering <10% of the
state population to a score 8.
A3.2 Unitary with SA to unitary: abolition
or weakening of strong regional
governments covering <10% of the
state population to a score 8.
A4.1 Unitary with SA to federal: extension
of strong regional governments to
the entire state population.
A4.2 Federal to unitary with SA: abolition
or weakening of strong regional
governments to a score <8, cover-
ing >90% but <100% of the state
population.
A5.1 Unitary with SA to partially federal:
extension of strong regional gov-
ernments to >10% but <100% of
the state population
A5.2 Partially federal to unitary with SA:
abolition or weakening of strong
regional government to a score
<8 covering >90% but <100% of
the state population
A6.1 Partially federal to federal: extension
of strong regional governments to
the entire state population.
A6.2 Federal to partially federal: abolition
or weakening of strong regional
government to a code <8 covering
up to 90% of the state population.
B Weak—change of degree within
categories
B1.1 Introduction of macro-local
governments
B1.2 Abolition of macro-local
governments
B2.1 Introduction of weak regional gov-
ernments (score 8)
B2.2 Abolition of weak regional govern-
ments (score 8)
(continued)
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Measuring Autonomy
To ground these classifications in a numerical scale, in this section, I develop an
index to measure the autonomy at the heart of the notion of de/centralization as
conceptualized above. On the basis of the disaggregation of autonomy into three
dimensions, the index is made up of three components (table 2).18
The first component, institutional autonomy, seeks to measure the degree to
which subcentral governments have an institutional set up conducive to acting
Table 1 Continued
B Weak—change of degree within
categories
B3.1 Replacement of macro-local govern-
ments with more autonomous but
still weak regional governments
(score 8)
B3.2 Replacement of weak regional gov-
ernments (score 8) with macro-
local governments with lower
autonomy
B4.1 Replacement of weak regional gov-
ernments (score 8) with more
autonomous macro-local
governments
B4.2 Replacement of macro-local govern-
ments with regional governments
with lower autonomy
B5.1 Increase in the autonomy of macro-
local governments
B5.2 Decrease in the autonomy of macro-
local governments
B6.1 Replacement of an existing tier of
macro-local governments with a
new tier of macro-local govern-
ments with higher autonomy
B6.2 Replacement of an existing tier of
macro-local governments with a
new tier of macro-local govern-
ments with lower autonomy
B7.1 Increase in the autonomy of weak
regional governments, to a score
8
B7.2 Decrease in the autonomy of weak
regional governments (score 8)
B8.1 Replacement of an existing tier of
weak regional governments with a
new tier of regional governments
with higher but still weak auton-
omy (score 8)
B8.2 Replacement of an existing tier of
weak regional governments (score
8) with a new tier of regional
governments with lower autonomy
B9.1 Increase in the autonomy of regional
governments in federal and (for
regions already possessing an au-
tonomy score 8) partially federal
or unitary with special autonomy
states
B9.2 Decrease in the autonomy of regional
governments in federal and (for
regions already possessing an au-
tonomy score 8) partially federal
or unitary with special autonomy
states, to a score 8
B10.1 Strong autonomy (score 8) granted
to more but not all regions in a
partially federal state
B10.2 Some but not all regions in a partially
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Table 2 Measurement of regional and macro-local autonomy
Institutional autonomy (0–3)
0: no general-purpose macro-local or regional administration
0.5: a general-purpose administration without an assembly and with a central-government
appointed executive
1: a general-purpose administration with an indirectly elected assembly and a central-
government appointed or dual executive (one appointed by central government, the other
appointed by the regional assembly)
1.5: a general-purpose administration with a directly elected assembly and a central-government
appointed or dual executive (one appointed by central government, the other appointed by
the regional assembly)
2: a general-purpose administration with an indirectly elected assembly and an executive
responsible to the latter
2.5: a general-purpose administration with a directly elected assembly and an executive elected by
the assembly or directly elected
3: a general-purpose administration with a directly elected assembly, an executive elected by the
assembly or directly elected, and constitutive autonomy and/or veto over its constitutional
status
Policy autonomy (0–7)
0: the administration is advisory only
1.5: the administration has executive responsibilities only
2: the administration has the power to enact secondary legislation in one of the following areas:
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy
2.5: the administration has the power to enact secondary legislation in at least two of the
following areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy
3.5: the administration has the power to enact primary legislation in one of the following areas—
economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy—concurrently with central
government
4: the administration has the power to enact primary legislation in at least two of the following
areas—economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy—concurrently with
central government
5: the administration has the exclusive power to enact primary legislation in one of the
following areas—economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy
6: the administration has the exclusive power to enact primary legislation in at least two of the
following areas—economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy
0.5: subject to central government veto
þ0.5: the administration has control over one or more of the following: civil and criminal law, a
police force, the judiciary, local government
þ0.5: the administration has a veto on central government policy affecting the region
(continued)
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autonomously. The aspects taken into account are whether an assembly—when
present—is directly elected or not, whether the executive is accountable to the
assembly or directly elected as opposed to being appointed by the central
government, and whether the government has autonomy over its own institutional
set-up (constituent autonomy). The scores range from 0–3.
The second component, policy autonomy, intends to measure the degree to which
a subcentral government has control over public policy. A key distinction here is
whether a government has executive responsibilities only (i.e., it implements policies
set by the central government), secondary law-making powers (i.e., it can modify
state laws to an extent) or primary law-making powers (i.e., it sets the primary legal
framework for a given policy area)19 in at least one of the three main areas of
government policy: economic, cultural-educational, and welfare.20 A subsidiary
distinction is whether such powers—typically of execution and secondary legislation
but occasionally of primary legislation too—are subject to central government veto or
not. Additional aspects taken into account are whether the government also controls
important functions such as policing and the judiciary. The scores range from 0–7.
The third component, fiscal autonomy, is meant to capture the discretion a
subcentral government has in raising the revenues necessary to finance its
operations. The key distinction here is three-fold: whether its revenues come
primarily from conditional transfers, or from forms of revenue-sharing (with or
without rate discretion), or from taxes of which it controls both base and rate.21
The scores range from 0–4. Table 2 details the scores attributed.
Table 2 Continued
Fiscal autonomy (0–4)
0: the administration is primarily financed from conditional transfers from a higher or lower
level of government
0.5: the administration is primarily financed from a mix of conditional transfers and own
revenues, without rate discretion
1: the administration is primarily financed from a mix of conditional transfers and own
revenues with rate discretion
2: the administration is primarily financed from a mix of unconditional transfers—including
revenue-sharing—and own revenues, without rate discretion (þ0.5 if with veto over central
transfers)
2.5: the administration is primarily financed from a mix of unconditional transfers – including
revenue-sharing—and own revenues, with rate discretion (þ0.5 if with veto over central
transfers)
3.5: the administration is primarily financed from own revenues whose rate but not base is set by
itself
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The weighting given to each of the three components and the scores attributed
to the various forms they take are intended to capture their relative importance for
the notion of autonomy, as I have conceptualized it.
Aggregation
With all multi-dimensional concepts, a key challenge in devising a measurement
scheme is what rules to adopt to aggregate the measures for each of the components
into a measure for the concept as a whole (e.g., Bogaards 2012; Goertz 2006, 95–
127). Goertz (2006) points out that this involves two choices: i) the weight to give
to each component; and ii) the aggregation method itself. As regards the latter, he
outlines three main procedures—the sum, the product, and the minimum—and
discusses how they relate to the structure of the concept at hand. He argues that the
sum is appropriate for a “family resemblance” type of concept, in which one
component can compensate for another, whereas the product or the minimum are
more appropriate for a “necessary and sufficient conditions” concept. The
distinction between the two types of concept, however, should be thought of not as
a dichotomy but as a continuum defined by different degrees of substitutability.
As seen above, the unitary/federal distinction proposed here, that is, grounded
in the “background concept” of autonomy and the “systematized concept” of de/
centralization, is closer to the “necessary and sufficient conditions” end of the
spectrum but is also characterized by a non-negligible degree of substitutability
among its three components and by the fact that policy autonomy is
conceptualized as being much more important than both institutional and fiscal
autonomy. In addition to aiming to distinguish unitary from federal systems,
moreover, I am also interested in the degree of de/centralization within each of
these categories. Given the properties of the concept and the objectives of the
measurement exercise, giving equal weights to the three components and
aggregating their scores on the basis of their minimum would not be appropriate.
The aggregation method I have chosen instead consists in weighting the
components differently to try to capture their relative importance and to aggregate
them on a sum basis.22 As discussed below, I believe this method delivers the
highest “content validity” for the overall measure.
On this basis, the aggregate scores range from 0–14 and a government needs to
score at least 8 to have sufficient autonomy to be considered “strong.” The
aggregate score of 8 is arrived at as follows:
(a) possessing a general-purpose administration with a directly elected assembly
and an executive elected by the assembly or directly elected (2.5 on the
institutional autonomy component)
(b) possessing the power to enact primary legislation in at least one major area of
government action—economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state
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policy—even if concurrently with the central government (3.5 on the policy
autonomy component)
(c) being financed primarily from a mix of unconditional transfers—including
revenue-sharing—and own revenues, without rate discretion (2 on the fiscal
autonomy component).
As discussed above, while the three components are individually necessary, they
are not necessary to the same extent and there are different degrees of
substitutability between them. Hence, the three individual minima should be
considered the “hard” thresholds and the aggregate score of 8 a “pragmatic” rather
than a “hard” threshold.23 On this basis, an aggregate autonomy score of 8 can thus
be treated as the threshold between a subcentral government, being in a unitary, as
opposed to a federal relationship vis-a-vis the central government (figure 1).
Validation
Miller (2007, 89–91; also Seawright and Collier 2014, 113) discusses three
validation methods: “content,” “criterion,” and “construct” validation. Content
validation evaluates the measures against qualitative expert judgment, criterion
validation is based on a comparison with similar measures that are available in the
existing literature, whereas construct validation entails employing the measures as
an independent variable representing the concept of interest in a causal analysis
and assessing the extent to which they provide a more plausible explanation of a
given outcome.
When new measures of a given concept rest on a different specification of the
concept compared to existing measures—as is the case here—construct and
criterion validation face significant obstacles. Therefore, I have opted for content
validation, which, according to Miller (2007, 91; also Bowman, Lehoucq, and
Mahoney 2005, 964), is the most robust validation test in the case of measures
based on a new conceptualization. I have pursued content validation in two ways.
First, as detailed in Section A1 of the Supplemental Online File, I sought to build
validity in ex ante by basing the scores on a detailed and extensive reading of the
qualitative literature on each case. Second, as shown in Table A6 in the
Supplemental Online File, by assessing ex post the resulting typology against the
expert judgment of the qualitative literature in the field. In the light of this two-
step procedure, the measures and the typology put forward in the present article
appear to have high content validity.
Application toWestern Europe, 1950^2015
Applying the above framework to the Western European states,24 based on
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Austria Unitarya (7.5) No change Unitary (7.5)
Belgium Unitary (3.5) Introduction of strong regional govern-
ments for the entire country and
formal transformation into a federal
state: A1.1
Federal (11.5)
Denmark Unitary with SA Strengthening of traditional macro-local
governments (4>7) followed by re-
placement of the latter with regional
governments with lower autonomy
(7>3.5) in the mainland; slight in-
crease in the autonomy of the regional
government in the Faroes: B5.1 then
B4.2; B9.1
Unitary with SA
(4b; 12.5c) (3.5b; 13.5c)
Finland Unitary with SA Replacement of traditional macro-local
units with new macro-local units with
slightly higher autonomy: B6.1
Unitary with SA
(1.5d; 12e) (3.5d; 12e)
France Unitary (6) Introduction of weak regional govern-
ments and restoration of the tradi-
tional macro-local governments’
previous level of autonomy: B2.1 and
B5.1
Unitary (6)
Germany Federal (12.5) Weakening of the autonomy of strong
regional governments: B9.2
Federal (10.5)
Ireland Unitary (3.5) Introduction of regional units with weak
autonomy: B2.1
Unitary (3.5)
Italy Partially federal Extension of strong regional government
to the entire country: A6.1
Federal (9/10)
(3.5f; 8.5g)
Netherlands Unitary (4.5) Slight strengthening of traditional
macro-local governments: B5.1
Unitary (5)
Norway Unitary (2) Strengthening of traditional macro-local
governments: B5.1
Unitary (7)
Portugal Unitary (2) Abolition of traditional macro-local units
and introduction of strong regional




Spain Unitary (4/6j) Introduction of strong regional govern-
ments for the entire country: A1.1
Federal (10/11.5)
Sweden Unitary (7.5) No change Unitary (7.5)
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in table 3 and detailed in table A5 in the Supplemental Online File. To avoid the
problems generated by adding the scores of more than one tier of subcentral
government, discussed above, the scores for each country are based on those of the
highest-scored tier, be that a regional or a macro-local one.25 Section A1 in the
Supplemental Online File details the scoring decisions and the sources utilized.
The validation of these scores against the qualitative literature shows (table A7 in
the Supplemental Online File) that the scheme proposed in this article delivers more
accurate measures of de/centralization than the RAI or other existing schemes. As
shown in table 4, this is the case even if we use the RAI regional self-rule scores as
measures of de/centralization. Consider the following four comparisons. On the RAI
measures: (i) Flanders scores equal to the Austrian L€ander; (ii) the Italian ordinary
regions score equal to the German L€ander and both of them score higher than
Scotland; (iii) the Norwegian or Swedish counties score equal to Northern Ireland;
and (iv) Wales scores lower than the English counties. On the measures proposed
here, and in line with the qualitative literature: (i) Flanders scores significantly higher
than the Austrian L€ander; (ii) Scotland scores higher than the German L€ander and
the latter score higher than the Italian ordinary regions; (iii) Northern Ireland scores
significantly higher than the Norwegian or Swedish counties; and (iv) Wales scores
higher than the English counties.
Three main substantive implications follow. First, the conceptualization of the
unitary/federal distinction as a dichotomy finds empirical validation. States widely
considered either unitary or federal cluster into two distinct groups, with the
former never scoring above 7.5 and the latter never scoring less than 8. However,
two states that are considered unitary from a formal constitutional perspective






Switzerland Federal (12.5) No change Federal (12.5)
UK Unitary with SA Extension of strong regional government
to Scotland and Wales: A5.1
Partially federalm
(6.5k; 11l) (6.5k; 11.5n; 11o;
11l)
Notes: See Supplemental Online File for measurement details. aScore for 1955; bMainland, cFaroes;
dMainland; eA˚land; fOrdinary statute regions; gSpecial statute regions; hMainland; iAzores and
Madeira; jAlava and Navarre; kEngland; lNorthern Ireland; mThe combined population of
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whereas Austria, a state formally classified as federal, should be treated as de facto
unitary. This has important consequences for the cross-country analysis of the
consequences of different degrees and kinds of de/centralization. Second, the
conceptualization of de/centralization across the unitary/federal distinction as a
difference of kind, not merely of degree, is buttressed by the presence of consistent
patterns: i) subcentral governments in unitary states never have constituent
autonomy or primary law-making powers; ii) constituent autonomy and primary
law-making powers are almost never associated with indirectly elected assemblies
and executives appointed by central government26 nor are they ever associated with
a high dependence on conditional transfers; iii) subcentral governments in unitary
systems never control both the base and the rate of the taxes from which their
draw their revenues. Third, it follows that the claim that de/centralization is not
orthogonal to federalism is thus also empirically validated. Although there are














Italy–Ordinary statute 15 9











UK–Northern Ireland 12 11
aHooghe et al. (2016).
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more or less centralized unitary states and more or less decentralized federal states,
de/centralization in the two sets of cases differs in kind, not merely in degree.
Conclusions
Despite considerable scholarly effort, political science has made limited progress in
answering important questions about the causes and effects of state structures. A
key reason for this is that we still lack a consensus on how to conceptualize and
measure de/centralization. Successfully establishing whether different degrees and
kinds of de/centralization lead to superior governance outcomes or why de/
centralization has gone further in some states than others rests on being able to
correctly measure and classify cases.
Based on a combination of graded measurement and qualitative classification,
the framework put forward in this article provides a specification of how de/
centralization differs across the unitary/federal distinction as well as more valid
measures of de/centralization across cases and over time than those currently
available. It thus holds the promise of facilitating theoretical advances in
understanding the origins and consequences of state structures, not only in
Western Europe but also, in principle, in other regions of the world.
Supplementary Data
Supplementary data are available at Publius: The Journal of Federalism online.
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1. Aristotle ([c.322BC] 1988, 106), quoted in Oates (1972, 1).
2. De/centralization can be approached from both a static and a dynamic perspective.
Static de/centralization refers to the vertical distribution of powers at any given point
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use the term de/centralization to refer to static de/centralization and to dynamic de/
centralization in general terms whereas I use centralization or decentralization to refer
to a specific direction of change.
3. Throughout the article, I use the term “state” to refer to the political system as a
whole, and the term “regions” to refer to the largest subcentral units of government,
including the constituent units of federal states.
4. For instance, if we measure de/centralization as proposed by Gerring and Thacker
(2004), as well as by Hooghe et al. (2016), decentralization is in a statistically
significant positive correlation with corruption in Western Europe whereas if we
measure it as proposed in this article, there is no statistically significant positive
association between the two. The data are available from the author upon request.
5. Some authors such as Livingston (1952, 88) have questioned the value of trying to
identify the boundary between unitary and federal states, arguing that the “differences
are of degree rather than of kind.” Although I believe, as conceptually developed and
empirically demonstrated in the article, that de/centralization varies in kind, not merely
in degree, across the unitary/federal divide, I do so very much in the spirit advocated
by Livingston, viz. of going beyond the official constitutional characterization in trying
to capture how political systems operate de facto.
6. For instance, the UK counties are included but the Irish counties are excluded
(Hooghe et al. 2016, Appendix–Regional Scores).
7. I consider Hooghe et al.’s categories of “institutional depth” and “representation” to be
both, in essence, institutional measures while “fiscal autonomy” and “borrowing
autonomy” can be considered fiscal measures, broadly understood, in that they pertain
to government revenues.
8. On the distinction between differences of degree and of kind, see, among others,
Sartori ([1975] 2009, 77-8) and Goertz (2006, 5).
9. Some authors (e.g. Elazar 1971, 99) have argued that federal systems are “non-
centralized” as opposed to de/centralized. I do not embrace this claim because it
presupposes a dichotomous understanding of de/centralization. From this perspective,
federal systems are non-centralized because they constitutionally reserve some powers
to the constituent units whereas unitary systems are centralized because central
governments possess all powers. As I have sought to explain and justify in the article, I
conceptualize de/centralization as a continuum rather than a dichotomy. From this
perspective, all systems are more or less decentralized (or less/more centralized).
Federations are also more or less de/centralized because they all have a given
distribution of power which reserves some important powers to the central
government. From this perspective, non-centralization would imply the absence of a
central government, which, in turn, would imply no federation.
10. Cf. Mackenzie and Chapman’s formulation (1951, 187) of the distinction between a
federal and a regional state: “ ‘federal’ and ‘regional’ will not lie in opposition to one
another, but in continuity, as segments of an unbroken slope.”
11. In this article I focus on the distinction between unitary and federal systems in relation
to de/centralization and I do not aim to provide a full conceptualization of the features
of a federal system.
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12. Such an ability is understood as defined by the body of law in force at a given time, as
opposed to the letter of the constitution.
13. This does not deny that some systems, especially during phases of transition, could be
genuinely borderline.
14. In certain circumstances, an indirectly elected assembly might also provide a sufficient
level of institutional autonomy. In the interest of concision, I do not pursue this point
here.
15. The rationale for setting the threshold at 10 per cent is based on the need to capture
conceptually the empirical difference we can observe for 2015 between Portugal, where
strong autonomy affects approximately five per cent of the population, and the UK,
where strong autonomy affects approximately 16 per cent of the population.
16. These categories are similar to what Stepan (2013, 234) calls “federacies.” As I explain
below, I think it preferable to reserve the term “federacy” for constitutionally
unincorporated territories.
17. While Hooghe et al. (2016) treat it as a lower tier of regional government, I, in line
with the prevailing scholarly practice (e.g. Bertrana and Heinelt 2011; also Tonboe
1991, 21; Hansen 1993, 313), conceptualize counties, provinces, departements etc. as
the upper tier of local government, hence the label “macro-local.”
18. Table A3 in the Supplemental Online File details where this conceptualization departs
from, or follows, that underpinning the RAI.
19. The distinction between primary and secondary legislation can be illustrated with a UK
example, where prior to 2006 the Welsh Assembly could only partially adapt (in the
form of secondary legislation) an act of parliament, which represented primary
legislation. The distinction is akin to that found in many systems between an act of the
legislature (as primary legislation) and delegated legislation enacted by the executive (as
secondary legislation).
20. The economic, cultural-educational, and welfare policy areas correspond to the first-
level categories Economic affairs; Recreation, culture, and religion and Education; and
Social protection in the classification of the functions of government developed by the
OECD (2017, 256–7). Within each area, as detailed in the Supplemental Online File, I
have based the coding on the distribution of specific functions.
21. Subcentral governments typically have access to other forms of revenue besides taxes but
the latter generally provide the lion’s share of their revenues hence my focus on taxes.
22. Aggregation by product would also be acceptable but it would produce high-figure
scores that would be more difficult to interpret.
23. This is on the ground that it is technically possible for a government to score above 8 by
having very high scores on two of the components and a sub-threshold score on a third
one but that would be “incoherent” and it is thus unlikely to be observed in practice. The
empirical mapping conducted in this article validates such an assumption.
24. Meaning Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The mini-states (population below 1m) Iceland, Luxembourg, and Malta, and the
micro-states (population below 100,000) Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino,
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25. As the coding does not take into account the lower level of local government (the
municipalities), it does not provide a full measure of de/centralization. It does
measure, however, the extent of de/centralization that is relevant to identifying the
differences of kind in state structures, which is the article’s focus.
26. Belgium between 1970 and 1995 was an exception, which can be explained by the
provisional nature of the constitutional arrangements in place during that period.
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